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Abstract
This paper documents the co-evolution of social capital, measured as generalized
trust, and ﬁnancial development over the twentieth century. I use cross generations
inherited trust of Americans with foreign ancestors to track trust in their home
country in 1913 and 1990. The paper documents a positive cross-section relation-
ship between trust and ﬁnancial development in 1913. Then, I show that increasing
trust is also associated with increasing ﬁnancial development at the country level
over the twentieth century. In other words, countries that experienced larger im-
provements in trust also experienced a stronger ﬁnancial development. These results
are robust to the introduction of real GDP per capita and trade openness as alter-
native determinants of ﬁnancial development.
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Mr. Untermyer: Is not commercial credit based primarily upon money or
property?
Mr. Morgan: No, sir; the ﬁrst thing is character.
Mr. Untermyer: Before money or property?
Mr. Morgan: Before money or anything else. Money can not buy it.
Mr. Untermyer: So that a man with character, without anything at all behind
it, can get all the credit he wants, and a man with the property can not get
it?
Mr. Morgan: That is very often the case. [...] A man I do not trust could
not get money from me on all the bonds in Christendom.
Mr. Untermyer: That is the rule all over the world?
Mr. Morgan: I think that is the fundamental basis of business.
Audition of J. Pierpont Mogan by Samuel Untermyer, counsel for the Committee.
Money Trust Investigation: Investigation of ﬁnancial and monetary conditions in the United States,
subcommittee of the committee on banking and currency.
Washington - Government Printing Oﬃce - 1913.
1 Introduction
As noted by Arrow (1972), virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an el-
ement of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. This statement
cannot be more valid than for ﬁnancial transactions involving debtors and creditors that
are mutually dependent as soon as a contract is concluded between them. Accordingly,
trust and ﬁnancial development should evolve simultaneously over time.
Trust is a speciﬁc component of social capital. Financial development and social cap-
ital are two ﬁelds that have received a large interest during the recent years. However,
the link between these two concepts has been directly addressed only by Guiso et al.
(2004). These authors exploited social capital diﬀerences within Italy. In this paper, I
document the co-evolution of social capital, measured as generalized trust, and ﬁnancial
development over the twentieth century at the country level. As in Rajan and Zingales
(2003), ﬁnancial development in 1913 and 1990 is measured using the ratio of deposits
in commercial banks over GDP, the ratio of total stock market capitalization over GDP,
and the number of listed companies per million inhabitants. I use changes in inherited
trust among Americans immigrants of diﬀerent generations to track changes in trust in
their home country between 1913 and 1990. I ﬁrst document a positive cross-section re-
lationship between trust and ﬁnancial development in 1913. Then, I show that increasing
trust is also associated with increasing ﬁnancial development at the country level over
the twentieth century. In other words, countries that experienced larger improvements
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trust also experienced a stronger ﬁnancial development. These results are robust to the
introduction of real GDP per capita and trade openness as alternative determinants of
ﬁnancial development.
Most of recent studies about ﬁnancial development have converged around the institu-
tional question. Since the seminal work of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), a large number of
paper have emphasized the crucial role of the legal and political systems as determinants
of ﬁnancial development. One of the most inﬂuential of those paper has been Rajan and
Zingales (2003). According to these authors, ﬁnancial development is partly determined
by the degree of openness of an economy. The present paper sheds light on social capital
as an alternative determinant of ﬁnancial development.
Social capital as gained a large interest as a determinant of economic performance.
Knack and Keefer (1997) showed that countries with higher social capital have also better
institutions, higher and more equal incomes and a better educated population. Similar
evidences have been provided by Tabellini (2005) in the case of European regions. Guiso
et al. (2006, 2008a, 2008b) presented some evidences about the way economic experiences
from the distant past may shape current economic performance, through transmission of
adequate norms. Dincer and Uslaner (2010) have found a positive relationship between
trust and growth. More recently, Algan and Cahuc (2010) provide new evidences regard-
ing the impact of trust on economic development. See also Zack and Knack (2001), Knack
(2001), or Tabellini (2007) for additional developments. As pointed out by Guiso et al.
(2004), ﬁnancial behavior is a domain in which social capital, and the various norms of
cooperation associated with this concept, is likely to have large impacts.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology and the data.
Then, empirical results are presented in section 3. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Data and methodology
This section, ﬁrst presents the relationships which will be estimated. These estimations
necessitate data on trust in the early twentieth century. Such data do not exist, but can
be approximated by inherited trust of Americans. Finally, I brieﬂy describe the data on
ﬁnancial development used in this paper.
The ﬁrst relationship I am going to estimate is the cross-section relationship between
trust and ﬁnancial development in the early twentieth century. Thus, the estimated model
is :
FinDevi = α + β1 Trusti + εi, (1)
where FinDevi denotes ﬁnancial development in country i, Trusti represents the level of
trust in country i, and εi is the error term. The estimation of parameter β1 will thus
rely on diﬀerences in trust across countries. Parameter β1 captures the eﬀect of trust on
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ﬁnancial development in space.
The second relation estimated in this paper is the within-country relationship between
trust and ﬁnancial development over the twentieth century. In this case, the estimated
model is :
FinDevit = α + β2 Trustit + Ii + εit, (2)
where FinDevit denotes ﬁnancial development in country i at time t, Trustit represents
the level of trust in country i at time t, Ii is a country ﬁxed eﬀect, and εit is the error
term. The estimation of parameter β2 will thus rely on diﬀerences in trust across time
at the country level. Parameter β2 captures the eﬀect of trust on ﬁnancial development
over time.
Most cross-country comparisons of the impact of social capital use the individual
answers to subjective questions from surveys such as the World Values Survey or the
European Social Survey for example. Individual answers are aggregated at the country
level to obtain any indicator of social capital. These surveys have been conducted only
since the eighties. This makes the computation of any time-varying indicator of social
capital very diﬃcult because individual values are widely recognized as variables that
evolve very slowly over time, as deep parameters of any society. Beside this, a direct
consequence of the period covered by these surveys is that trust indicators for the early
twentieth century cannot be obtained directly.
This challenge can be overcome by using inherited trust of Americans. This method
(used by Carroll et al. (1994) and Fernandez and Fogli (2009) among others) relies on the
epidemiological approach, i.e., individuals diﬀering only in one dimension are observed
in the same context. Diﬀerences in any outcome are thus attributed to diﬀerences in
the dimension of interest. In this paper, I use Americans interviewed in the General
Social Survey (GSS), taking into account the country of origin of their ancestors. Select-
ing diﬀerent dates of birth and diﬀerent generations of immigration, it is thus possible
to asses diﬀerences in trust in origin countries for diﬀerent periods. Namely, following
Algan and Cahuc (2010), inherited trust at time T is estimated using immigrants of sec-
ond generation born before T ; third generation immigrants born before T + 25 ; and
fourth generation immigrants born before T + 50. This method necessitates to choose
a suﬃciently large time gap between periods to avoid any overlapping problems. I es-
timate inherited trust in 1913 and 1990 using this method.1 This allow to obtain two
observations per country for trust.
1Accordingly, trust in 1913 is estimated using Americans of second generation born before 1913, of
third generation born before 1938, and of fourth generation born before 1963. Similarly, trust in 1990 is
estimated using Americans of second generation born between 1913 and 1990, of third generation born
after 1938, and of fourth generation born after 1963.
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Concretely, I estimate the following probit model :
P (Trustci = 1) = a0 +
n∑
j=1
ajxji + Ic + εi, (3)
where P (Trustci = 1) is the probability that individual i, claiming that its ancestors came
from country c, answers most people can be trusted  to the following question of the GSS
: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be
too careful in life ? . Ic is the origin country ﬁxed eﬀect, while Norway is the reference
category2, xji represents an individual characteristic
3 of respondent i, and εi is the error
term.
Marginal eﬀects estimated according to equation (3) for 1913 and 1990 are presented
in tables 1 and 2. The marginal eﬀects associated with origin countries in 1913 and
1990 are presented by ﬁgure 1. This ﬁgure and the tables should be read as follows :
in 1913, Americans with Canadians ancestors are 12 percents less likely to be trusting
than Americans with Norwegian ancestors ; in 1990, Americans with French ancestors
are 13 percents less likely to answer most people can be trusted  than Americans with
Norwegian ancestors. Comparing inherited trust in 1913 and 1990 for a given country
gives information of how trust in the country has evolved with respect to trust in Norway
between these two dates. For example, the gap in trust with respect to Norway increased
in Switzerland (the marginal eﬀect moves from −0.08 to −0.11). Similarly, the gap
with respect to Norway has vanished and became opposite in the case of Denmark (the
marginal eﬀects moves from −0.15 to 0.01).
Following Rajan and Zingales (2003), I collected data on ﬁnancial development in
1913 and 1990 for 14 countries. I used three diﬀerent indicators of ﬁnancial development.
The ﬁrst one is the ratio of deposits in commercial and savings banks to GDP. I updated
the data of Rajan and Zingales (2003) using data from Mitchell (2003), Flandreau and
Zumer (2004) and the United Nations Statistics Division. The two other indicators are
the ratio between stock market capitalization and GDP and the number of listed ﬁrms
per million people.4 See Rajan and Zingales (2003) for a discussion of these measures of
ﬁnancial development.
Comparing the evolution of trust and ﬁnancial development over the twentieth century
requires long period data for both ﬁnancial development and trust. Data on ﬁnancial
development are remarkably limited for the early twentieth century. A similar remark
applies to the data on trust which simply do not exist for this period. Given todays state
2The choice of Norway as the reference origin country is arbitrary and does not drive our results.
3I control for gender, education, age, age squared, religion, income, marital status, and employment
status.
4Total stock market capitalization and the number of listed companies are not available for Greece
and Spain in 1913. As a consequence, all empirical results using these two variables will rely only on 12
countries.
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of research, the only way to track trust diﬀerences in the distant past is to use inherited
trust of Americans. This method is constrained both by the number of observations in the
GSS and by the number of proposed country of origin in this questionnaire. Taking into
account these two sets of constraints for available data, the richest regression presented
in this paper only includes 14 countries. Since the both data sources are short, it would
be virtually impossible (or at least extremely diﬃcult) to assemble a larger data set.
3 Empirical results
This section presents the empirical results. I ﬁrst present the cross-section relationship
between trust and ﬁnancial development in 1913. Then, I look at the within-country
relationship between trust and ﬁnancial development between 1913 and 1990.
Inherited trust oﬀers a unique opportunity to observe the relationship between trust
and ﬁnancial development in the early twentieth century. Figures 2, 3, and 4 plot inherited
trust and ﬁnancial development in 1913. All ﬁgures exhibit a positive association between
trust and ﬁnancial development. This suggests that countries with higher generalized
trust had a more developed ﬁnancial system at the beginning of the twentieth century.
According to these ﬁgures, diﬀerences in social capital explain between 15% and 26% of
the cross-country diﬀerences in ﬁnancial development in 1913.
However, this positive relationship could be determined by omitted variables. Table
3 presents the estimated coeﬃcients of equation (1), controlling for diﬀerences in real
GDP per capita and trade openness in 1913.5 In columns 1, 3, and 5, only real GDP
per capita is introduced as additional regressor. This reinforces the size and improve
the signiﬁcance level of the inherited trust coeﬃcient when the dependent variable is
either stock market capitalization over GDP or the number of listed ﬁrms per million
people. In the case of the ratio of deposits to GDP, the coeﬃcient of inherited trust
decreases and becomes less signiﬁcant but still very close to the 10 percents signiﬁcance
level (the p-value equals 0.113). In columns 2, 4, and 6, I introduce trade openness
as an additional explanatory variable. The magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcients of
inherited trust is unchanged. Furthermore, the coeﬃcient becomes signiﬁcant at the 10
percents signiﬁcance level when the dependent variable is the ratio of deposits to GDP.
Summary statistics for these regressions are presented in table 4. According to column 3
of table 3, a 10 percentage points increase in trust with respect to Norway is associated
with a 0.2 increase in stock market capitalization, which represents roughly one standard
deviation of this variable. Similarly, according to the estimated coeﬃcient of inherited
trust presented in column 6, the eﬀect of a 0.1 increase in trust is associated with a
one standard deviation change in the number of listed companies. These results show
5Real GDP per capita is taken from the Maddison's database. Trade openness is calculated as the
ratio of exports plus imports to GDP using using data from Mitchell (2003).
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that the positive cross-country relationship between trust and ﬁnancial development is
sizable and not driven by the simple diﬀerence in economic development. Furthermore,
the relationship persists when taking into account diﬀerences in trade openness, a major
determinant of ﬁnancial development as argued by Rajan and Zingales (2003).
The remaining of this section presents ﬁndings regarding the within-country rela-
tionship between trust and ﬁnancial development over the twentieth century. Figures
5, 6, and 7 present the relationship between changes in trust with respect to Norway
and changes in ﬁnancial development with respect to the same country over the period
1913-1990. The three slopes representing the linear relationships between variables are
positive. This suggests that changes in inherited trust explain between 5 and 10 percents
of changes in ﬁnancial development.
Table 5 conﬁrms these ﬁndings by presenting the estimated coeﬃcients of equation (2).
In columns 1, 3, and 5, ﬁnancial development in 1913 and 1990 is regressed on inherited
trust and real GDP per capita for the same dates, together with country ﬁxed eﬀects.
In columns 2, 4, and 6, I introduce a time dummy for 1990 to control for potential
convergence in ﬁnancial development across countries, as well as trade openness. The
estimated coeﬃcient of inherited trust is signiﬁcant when the dependent variable is either
total stock market capitalization or the number of listed companies. However, it is
not signiﬁcant in the case of the ratio of deposits to GDP. In the case of stock market
capitalization, the estimated eﬀect of a 0.1 change in inherited trust equals 0.25, which
represent one half of a standard deviation for changes in stock market capitalization.
For the number of listed companies, the comparable exercise leads to one third of a
standard deviation. In other words, a 0.1 increase in the share of trusting people between
1913 and 1990 is associated with 11 more listed companies at the country level. When
included simultaneously, neither real GDP per capita, nor trade openness, are found to
be signiﬁcantly correlated with ﬁnancial development.
These results show that the positive relationship between trust and ﬁnancial develop-
ment is also valid at the country level across time and that the eﬀect of trust on ﬁnancial
development is economically sizable. According to these estimates, the eﬀect of trust on
ﬁnancial development outperform the eﬀect of trade openness or economic development.
4 Conclusion
This paper shows that higher social capital, measured as generalized trust, is associated
with larger ﬁnancial development in 1913. Increasing trust is also associated with increas-
ing ﬁnancial development at the country level over the twentieth century. In other terms,
countries that experienced larger improvements in trust also experienced a stronger ﬁ-
nancial development. This relationship is robust to the introduction of real GDP per
capita and trade openness in empirical models.
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These results conﬁrm the evidence presented by Guiso et al. (2004) regarding the
importance of social capital in ﬁnancial development, and let room for future research
concerning the channels through which social capital favors ﬁnancial development. This
research agenda involves theoretical, as well as empirical work to establish to what ex-
tent norms of cooperation are substitutes or necessary conditions to build institutions
facilitating ﬁnancial development.
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Figures
Figure 1: Inherited trust in 1913 and 1990.
11
Figure 2: Relationship between inherited trust and the ratio of deposits to GDP in 1913.
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Figure 3: Relationship between inherited trust and stock market capitalization over GDP
in 1913.
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Figure 4: Relationship between inherited trust and the number of listed companies per
million people in 1913.
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Figure 5: Changes in inherited trust and in the ratio of deposits to GDP 1913-1990.
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Figure 6: Changes in inherited trust and in stock market capitalization over GDP 1913-
1990.
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Figure 7: Changes in inherited trust and in the number of listed companies per million
people 1913-1990.
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Tables
Table 1: Estimation of inherited trust in 1913.
Dependent variable is individual trust
Austria 0.0149* Male -0.00534
(0.00820) (0.0123)
Canada -0.119*** Age 0.0128***
(0.0141) (0.00187)
Denmark -0.149*** Age squared -9.08e-05***
(0.00164) (1.86e-05)
Great Britain -0.0739*** Married 0.0489***
(0.00180) (0.0109)
France -0.0733*** Protestant 0.0245
(0.00713) (0.0197)
Germany -0.0988*** Catholic 0.0494
(0.00345) (0.0459)
Greece -0.0753*** Education 0.0402***
(0.00715) (0.00163)
Italy -0.159*** Employed 0.0405**
(0.0143) (0.0170)
Nehterlands -0.131*** Income 0.000761
(0.00276) (0.00242)
Spain -0.201***
(0.0121)
Sweden -0.0717*** Observations 6769
(0.00228) Pseudo R-squared 0.0535
Switzerland -0.0793***
(0.00306)
Belgium 0.0366**
(0.0178)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Marginal eﬀects of a probit
model. For dummy variables, the reported coeﬃcient denotes the eﬀect of a discrete change. The
reference origin country is Norway. The sample is made of Americans of second generation born before
1913, of third generation born before 1938, and of fourth generation born before 1963. A constant term
and year ﬁxed eﬀects for the year of interview are also included.
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Table 2: Estimation of inherited trust in 1990.
Dependent variable is individual trust
Austria -0.122*** Male 0.0599***
(0.0101) (0.0208)
Canada -0.0935*** Age 0.00427
(0.00708) (0.00577)
Denmark 0.0118* Age squared -5.95e-06
(0.00688) (6.08e-05)
Great Britain -0.0524*** Married 0.0383
(0.0104) (0.0250)
France -0.130*** Protestant -0.0101
(0.00695) (0.0179)
Germany -0.0600*** Catholic -0.0208
(0.0124) (0.0167)
Greece -0.138*** Education 0.0447***
(0.0129) (0.00401)
Italy -0.0932*** Employed 0.0202*
(0.0107) (0.0121)
Netherlands -0.0900*** Income 0.00272
(0.00846) (0.00312)
Spain -0.0300***
(0.00727)
Sweden -0.0574*** Observations 2859
(0.0119) Pseudo R-squared 0.0597
Switerland -0.109***
(0.00902)
Belgium 0.0385**
(0.0160)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Marginal eﬀects of a probit
model. For dummy variables, the reported coeﬃcient denotes the eﬀect of a discrete change. The
reference origin country is Norway. The sample is made of Americans of second generation born between
1913 and 1990, of third generation born after 1938, and of fourth generation born after 1963. A constant
term and year ﬁxed eﬀects for the year of interview are also included.
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Table 4: Summary statistics for cross-section estimates in 1913.
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Deposits 14 .549 .249 .065 .916
Stock market capitalization 12 .592 .293 .16 1.09
Listed companies 12 39.205 28.618 6.32 108.7
Inherited trust 14 -.084 .067 -.201 .0366
Deposits is the ratio of deposits in commercial banks to GDP. Stock market capitalization is the
ratio of total stock market capitalization to GDP. Listed companies is the number of publicly traded
domestic companies per million inhabitants. These variables are given in absolute terms whereas they
are deﬁned with respect to Norway in table 3.
Table 6: Summary statistics for the relationship between trust and ﬁnancial development
over time at the country level, 1913-1990.
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Change in deposits 14 .058 .275 -.225 .739
Change in stock market capitalization 12 -.095 .555 -.75 1.28
Change in listed companies 12 -25.061 31.772 -101.49 17.05
Change in inherited trust 14 .018 .081 -.137 .171
Deposits is the ratio of deposits in commercial banks to GDP. Stock market capitalization is the
ratio of total stock market capitalization to GDP. Listed companies is the number of publicly traded
domestic companies per million inhabitants. Changes are computed for each country between 1913 and
1990.
20
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